Indirect network e ects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of complementary software products available for use with an electronic hardware device. In this note, we examine how trade liberalization a ects production structure in the presence of indirect network e ects. For these purposes we construct a simple
Introduction
The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration (e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA) has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization. Since liberalization often provides an opportunity to acquire varieties of products not available from domestic producers, welfare gains via increased product diversi cation are emphasized in the literatue.
1 As yet, however, the cases of \hardware/software" systems (i.e., hardware devices and the varieties of complementary software products) are downplayed in the trade literature.
In other words, little attention has been paid to the implications of trade liberalization in the presence of products with indirect (or virtual) network e ects.
Indirect network e ects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of complementary products available for an electronic hardware device. Examples of such devices include personal computers, video casette recorders, and consumer electronics products. In systems that pair hardware with software, an indirect network e ect arises because increases in 1 One of the seminal contributions on the gains from variety is Krugman (1979) . In a recent empirical study, Broda and Weinstein (2006) nd that the value to U.S. consumers of global variety growth in the 1972-2001 period was about 3 percent of GDP.
3 the number of users of hardware increase the demand for compatible software and hence the supply of software varieties. Since larger and more integrated markets often provide greater product variation, these characteristics a ect the degree to which indirect network e ects exist.
Despite the fact that many industries have indirect network e ects that are supported by trade liberalization, the literature on indirect network effects is almost exclusively focused on a closed economy. 2 Because the role of indirect network e ects is ampli ed in the globalized world, 3 it seems important to explore the impact of trade liberalization in the presence of products with indirect network e ects.
As our primary contribution, we examine how trade liberalization a ects production structure in the presence of indirect network e ects. For these 2 The seminal contributions on the role of a \hardware/software" system are Shy (1990, 1996) , Gandal (1992, 1996) and Desruelle et al. (1996) . See Economides (1996) , Shy (2001) and Gandal (2002) for surveys of the relevant literature.
In the international context, Gandal and Shy (2001) and that they will be o ered at marginal cost. In this and next sections, we consider the Home autarky situation.
Following Church and Gandal (1992) , consumer preferences over the combination of hardware and software are modelled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) CES utility function. We assume that the distribution of the tastes of Home (Foreign) consumers is uniform along a line of unit length t 2 [0; 1]. We normalize the total number of consumers in each country to 1.
5 In this way, we rule out Ricardian comparative advantage.
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The preferences of a consumer of type t for system h are:
where n h is the number of software products written for Hardware h (h = 0; 1), x h i is the level of consumption of software product i written for Hardware h, 1=(1 ) > 2 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of software products, and we assume that > k. k is a measure of the degree of product di erentiation between the hardware technologies: the greater k, the greater the degree of di erentiation
The representative consumer who purchases Hardware h will maximize
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
where p h i is the price of software variety i for Hardware h, e is the total expenditure allocated to hardware and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost)
of a unit of Hardware h.
The solution to this problem consists of the following demand functions:
where
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The indirect utility of a type-t consumer who purchases a system h is
The indirect utility function is concave in n h : the marginal bene t of another software variety is decreasing. Now, turn to the cost structure of software provision. The technology for the production of software is characterized by increasing returns to scale, since software creation typically involves xed costs. We denote the constant marginal cost of software production for every product by b, and the software development cost by f .
We assume that software rms are monopolistic competitors, and thus, each product is priced at a markup over marginal cost b:
The Model
In this section, we specify a simple game in which the strategy of each software rm in a decision to provide software for either hardware, 0 or 1. The timing of the game is as follows: 7 In the rst stage software rms enter the 6 Hereafter, we drop the superscript h.
7 This is taken from Church and Gandal's (1992) closed economy model.
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industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software rms have rational expectations. Although there may be more than one equilibrium software con guration, we show that the free-entry number of software rms, N = n 0 + n 1 , is unique, where n h is the number of rms providing software for Hardware h. In the second stage, software rms simultaneously choose which platform to provide software for. In the nal stage, each consumer purchases either a Hardware 0 or a Hardware 1 system and some of the compatible software. We solve this problem backward. To obtain a better understanding of the model, we extensively use a new graphical exposition for equilibrium con guration.
Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each system. From (5), a consumer located at t purchases Hardware 0 if the following inequality holds:
where use has been made of the equation n 0 + n 1 = N . Therefore, the location of the marginal consumer who purchase Hardware 0 is given by a 9 function of n 0 , that is,
And the rst derivative of t(n 0 ) is positive:
> 0: (9) This means that the share of Hardware 0 is increasing in the amount of software for it. It can also be shown that ( 1)] (10) and
Based on the above, we can draw the function t(n 0 ) as shown in Figure 1 , 2 1=( 1) kb =2(e c).
The second derivative of t(n 0 ) is negative (positive) if n 0 is smaller (greater) than
where > 2 from the assumption > 1=2. 9 The importance of discrimination between case B and C will appear in the following.
Note that in cases B and C, t(n 0 ) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are still two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, that is, 0 t 1, there exists a critical number of software rms for each type of hardware such that if the number of software rms for one technology exceeds the critical number, then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other hand, in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one hardware is standardized; no software for the other hardware exists. 
Second Stage
In the second stage, software rms simultaneously select the network for which to supply software are. Given the marginal consumer, t, and the number of competing software rms (n 0 or n 1 ), the pro t of a software rm writing software for Hardware 0 is
and that for Hardware 1 is
10 Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and provides no stand-alone bene ts, in case A, the marginal consumer, t, changes discontinuously to 0 or 1 when n 0 is equal to 0 or N .
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where x 1 = (e c)=n 1 p. From these equations, it is easily derived that
Based on the latter inequality, each rm considers whether t(n 0 ) is greater than n 0 =N or not, and then chooses the network to supply.
First Stage
At any equilibrium where two networks coexist, 0 (t; n 0 ) = 1 (t; n 1 ) must be satis ed. Therefore, t = n 0 =N holds at the equilibrium and
On the other hand, if all software rms provide software for one network at equilibrium, then (t; n 0 ) = (1; N ) or (t; n 1 ) = (0; N ) hold and
Thus, the pro t of each rm is independent of equilibrium software congurations, and the free-entry number of rms, N , is uniquely given by N = (e c)=f from the zero-pro t condition.
Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that 0 = 1 = 0 holds for any pair (t; n 0 ) on the dotted line in Figure 1 
Nash Equilibrium Con gurations
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium con gurations as follows: In order for a con guration to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be impossible for a software rm to switch networks and increase its pro t.
In case A, the graph of t(n 0 ) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1 . So, there are three equilibrium candidates; (n 0 = n 1 = N=2), (n 0 = N; n 1 = 0), and
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n 0 = n 1 = N=2) is stable in the sense of a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
Therefore, only two equilibria, (n 0 = N; n 1 = 0) and (n 0 = 0; n 1 = N ), are stable.
11
Finally, in case B, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve B and it is apparent from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n 0 = n 1 = N=2), 11 In the interval of n where t(n 0 ) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal consumer, t, is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line t = n 0 =N .
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(n 0 = N; n 1 = 0), and (n 0 = 0; n 1 = N ), are stable. So, we have the following lemma:
Lemma: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases emerge: ( 1)], a unique symmetric equilibrium exists, (n 0 = n 1 = N=2).
Case B: If kb =[(e c)(
equilibria, (n 0 = n 1 = N=2), (n 0 = N; n 1 = 0), and (n 0 = 0; n 1 = N ), exist.
2 1=( 1) kb =2(e c), only two equilibria, (n 0 = N; n 1 = 0) and (n 0 = 0; n 1 = N ), exist.
Although the present result is the same as that stated in Church and
Gandal's (1992) closed economy model, we believe that our graphical exopostion provides better understanding of the equilibrium con guration. Also, one major advantage of our graphical exposition is that it makes it easier to extend the analysis to the case of unequal preference distribution. 
The Impact of Trade Liberalization

The Case of Hardware Di erentiation
First, let us assume that the following condition is satis ed:
Note that this condition holds when the degree of hardware di erentiation (k) is relatively large (or the degree to which indirect network e ects exist is relatively low). In this case, two types of hardware exist both before and after trade liberalization. Thus, no consumer changes his or her hardware 15 and trade liberalization induces twice as many software varieties for each type of hardware: n 0 becomes 2n 0 and n 1 becomes 2n 1 . From (5), this clearly increases every consumer's utility.
Proposition 1: Given that condition (19) holds, both types of hardware remain in the equilibrium and both countries gain from trade liberalization.
Note that these gains correspond to those obtained from the \love-of-variety" approach to trade gains (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . Through trade liberalization, consumers in each country can obtain a wider variety of products, which results in mutual gains.
The Case of Hardware Standardization
Next, let us assume that the following condition is satis ed:
In this case, while both types of hardware exist before trade liberalization, only one type of hardware remains after liberalization. In other words, intensi ed indirect network e ects result in a reduced number of hardware varieties (2 rather than 1). For simplicity, let us suppose that only Hardware 1 remains after trade liberalization. In this case, some consumers have to switch 12 Note that 3 is required for this condition.
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from Hardware 0 to Hardware 1. While there are gains from the increased diversity of software available, there are losses from switching to the other network. The change in the indirect utility of a type-t consumer who switches to the other network is:
Note that the rst term on the RHS represents the gains from software diversi cation while the second term on the RHS represents costs from increased disutility. Let us de ne a type-t consumer who is indi erent to switching hardware as follows: 
1)=2
1+1= ( 1) = (2
Now we can state the possibility of losses from trade. 13 Note that, in the case of hardware standardization, the number of software varieties for Hardware 1 increases from n 1 to 4n 1 (or from N=2 to 2N This implies that trade liberalization leads some consumers to \switch"
to an other-dominated brand, thereby increasing disutility. Note that this case is highly contrasted with the cases of universal gains from trade, which are emphasized in the literature. 14 We would like to emphasize that trade liberalization, which forms a basis for a greater variety of software products (i.e., intensi ed indirect network e ects), may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior outcome.
Conclusions
Indirect network e ects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of complementary software products available for a hardware device. In this note, we examine how trade liberalization a ects production structure in the presence of indirect network e ects. For these purposes we 14 See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) . Related to the present result, Chou 
